Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agriculture Products Paper by Sykes, Alan O. & Bagwell, Kyle
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2004
Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agriculture Products Paper
Alan O. Sykes
Kyle Bagwell
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan O. Sykes & Kyle Bagwell, "Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agriculture Products Paper,"
Principles Of Trade Law: The World Trade Organization 1 (2004).
Chile -- Price Band System and Safeguard
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products
Kyle Bagwell
Columbia University
&
Alan 0. Sykes
University of Chicago
January 2004 (draft)
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the dispute brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by
Argentina concerning certain Chilean measures affecting the importation of wheat, wheat
flour, oil seeds. edible vegetable oils and sugar. The complaint by Argentina challenged
two types of policies - a "price band system" that was applicable to Ibur of those product
categories, and safeguards measures that wcrc applicable to dtrc of them. The WTO
panel ruled in favor of Argentina on both sets of measures.' It found that the price band
system violated Article IV of the Agriculture Agreement and Article 11 of GAiT 1994.
The safeguards measures, according to tile panel, violated various provisions of the
Safeguards Agreement, as well as Article XIX of" (NIl' 1994. Chile elected not to
appeal the panel ruling regarding the safeguards measures, but did appeal the adverse
finding as to the price band system. The Appellate Body subsequently affirmed in
substantial part the linding that the price band system violated Article 4 ofthe Agriculture
Agreement, but reversed the finding of a violation under Article 1I of GATT 1994.1 Chile
'Chile -- Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, Report or
the Panel. WTIDS207/R (May 3, 2002)(hereafter Panel Rep.).
2Chile -- Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-2002-2, WT/DS207/R (September 22,
2002)(hereaftcr AB Rep.).
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has since indicated an intention to comply with the ruling, and an arbitration pursuant to
Article 21.3 of the DSU has determined that the reasonahle period of time for compliance
will expire on December 23, 2003.
Because tie issues raised by Argentina regarding the safeguards measures have for the
most part surfaced in other cases that deal with them in greater detail, and because Chile
did not appeal the panel's lindings on these issues, we will not address them here.
Instead, we focus on the issues before the Appellate Body, devoting careful attention to
the treatment of the price band system, and very brief attention to some general
procedural issues.
The price band issue has reasonably broad significance for three reasons. First, price
band systems, which aim to reduce the volatility of agricultural prices, are maintained by
a number of WTO members. Indeed, the complaining nation in the case - Argentina --
maintains a price band system of its own lbr sugar imports. Second, a resolution of the
qxiestion as to the legality of the price band system implicates the broader question of
what agricultural measures were required to be "tarillied" under the Uruguay Round
Agreements. As shall be seen below, Chile's ultimate defeat before the Appellate Body
rested on the proposition that its price band system should have been converted into an
"ordinary customs duty" as the end of the Uruguay Round. Third, and perhaps most
interesting from an economic perspective, the case raises the question of what constraints
apply to WTO members that wish to vary their tariIf rates over time below their bound
levels. The Chilean price band system, as amended, ensured that any additional tariMh
required by the price band would not cause the total tarilron any imported good to exceed
the applicable tariff binding. Nevertheless, the system was condemned because the way
in which it was administered made it sufficiently "similar" to measures that had been
required to be "tariffied."
We proceed in the conventional fashion, laying out the legal issues and arguments in
Section 2. Section 3 oilers a critical analysis of the case from a law and economics
perspective.
'See Raj Bhala & David Guntz. WTO Case Review 2002, 20 Ariz. J. Int'l L. 143, 255
(2003).
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2. Factual and Legal Issues
2.1 Description of the Price Band System
The stated objcctive of the price band system was to "ensure a reasonable margin of
fluctuation of'domestic wheat, oil-seed, edible vegetable oil and sugar prices in relation to
the international prices for such products."' To this end, Chile employed a somewhat
convoluted procedure.
The price band itself was established annually. Depending on the product, either five or
ten years of data would be gathered on the monthly average prices of the product in the
"most relevant markets" abroad.5 The edible vegetable oil price was apparently FOIB
Chicago Exchange, for example, while the wheat price was that of Hard Red Winter No.
2 FOB Gulf (Kansas Exchange)." These prices were adjusted fbr inflation, and then
arrayed in ascending order. IMhe highest 25 percent and lowest 25 percent of these
average prices (35 percent in the case of sugar) were then discarded. From the remaining
prices, the highest and the lowest for each product would be selected. Ordinary tariffs,
transport, insurance and related costs vver then added to these high and low prices, thus
yielding a delivered price to Chile. These adjusted prices then becane the annual price
band for each product.
The process of establishing the price band was not transparent. There was apparently no
published information indicating which foreign markets were the "relevant" ones or how
they were selected. Likewise, no published information specified exactly which product
prices would be used (soybean oil prices or sunflowerseed oil prices in the case of edible
vegetable oils, for example). and no published source provided the basis for the various
adjustments used to convert from FOB to delivered prices.7
"AB Rep. 11.
5AB Rep. n. 15.
6AB 18.
7See Panel Rep. 7.44.
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Once the price band was established, it remained to compute the applicable duty on each
shipment at tle border. Interestingly, tile actual transaction prices of products entering
Chile were not employed, Rather, for each product, Chile would select a weekly
"reference price." That price x~uld he tile lowest FOB price observed in any foreign
"market of concern" during the week in which the shipment left its home market. Once
again, it was not clear how the "markets of concern" were selected, or precisely which
prices in those markets would be used.8 The refierence price was not adjusted for the
costs of delivering the product to Chile from the market in question.
To determine the total tariff liability for each import shipment under this system, Chile
would lirst apply its ordinary ad iwaorem tariff. In addition, Chile would ascertain when
the shipment left its home market, and identify the reference price for that week for the
product category in question. It would compare this reference price to the annual price
band. ilf the reference price fell below the lower threshold of the price band, an additional
specific duty would be applied to the shipment in an amount equal to the difference
between the reference price and the low threshold price. By contrast, if the reference
price fell outside the upper threshold of the price band, the importer would receive a
rebate equal to the difference between the reference price and the upper threshold price.
Finally, whenever the reference price fell within the price band, only the ordinary ad
valorem duty would be collected, regardless of the actual transaction price of the
shipment in question.
To illustrate, imagine a shipment of one ton of wheat arriving in Chile during the third
week of" September, and assume that its delivered price for tariff purposes is $100.
Assume further that Chile's ad valorem tariff on wheat is 10 percent. The shipment
originated in the United States during the first vcck of September. Assume further that
the annual price band for wheat is $130 - $180 per ton. Lastly, assume that the reference
price for wheat during the first week of September was $90 per ton. Then, total tariff
liability on the shipment would equal $50: $10 resulting from the 10 percent ad valorem
tariff, and another $40 resulting froim the difference between the lower threshold of the
price band ($130) and the reference price ($90). If the shipment had instead had a
delivered price of $200 and the pertinent reference price had been $190, tariff liability
would have been only $10: $20 based on the ad valoremn rate, less a $10 rebate due to the
fact that the reference price exceeded the upper threshold of the price band by $10.
8AB Rep. 1123-25.
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It is plain from the design ol' the system that it will tend to produce positive additional
tariffs (above the ad valorem duty) oi average (that is, the additional duties due to
reference prices below the price band will not on average be oinet by rebates due to
refirence prices above the price band). One reason is that the reference prices arc FOB
foreign markets, while the price hand is based on delivered prices to Chile. Further, the
reference price is always the lowest FOB price observed during the week in question in
some foreign market of relevance. The average duty can be further inflatcd (or not)
depending on precisely which foreign markets are used as the basis for the reference
price, and which product prices arc used. Finally, the rebates would never exceed the
ordinary ad valurem tariff (there was never a "negative" duty), but the additional duties
could well exceed it.
The reader may wonder how the total duty computed under this system related to Chile's
tarill'bindings. Chile had bound its tariffs under Article II of GAT 1994 at 31.5 percent
for all of the products at issue in the price band system. In practice, however, Chile
applied only a 7 or 8 percent tariff'raote to these products. Thus, as long as the additional
duties under the price band systcm did not exceed each shipment's delivered value for
tariff purposes multiplied by 31.5 percent less the applied ad valorem rate, the total tariff
remained within the binding. But the total duty had on occasion exceeded the binding.'0
After the dispute began, however, Chile enactcd an amendment to its price band system
providing that in no event should the total duty applied to any product covered by the
price band system exceed 31.5 percent of its value.
2.2 Argentina's Challenge and Chile's Response
2.2.1 Article If of'A'F 1994
Article IT(l)(b) of GATT 1994 provides:
The products described in...the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which
are the products of territories of' other contracting parties, shall, on their
"At one. point the applied rate is said to be 7 percent on all products in question, and at
another point it is said to be 8 percent. See All Rep. 111 14, 128.
'
0AB Rep. I410.
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importation into the tcritory to which the Schedule relates...be exempt from
ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for therein.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind
imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the
date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed
thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.
Argentina argued that the price band system violated Article 11 in two ways, First, as
noted, the total duties imposed by Chile on products covered by the system had at times
exceeded the applicable tariff binding. Each such instance, said Argentina, was a clear
violation of sentence one of Article lI(l)(b) in that it represented the application of
"ordinary customs duties" in excess of those set forth in Chile's Schedule of bindings.
Second, Argentina argued that Chile's price band legislation was "mandatory," in the
sense that it allbrded customs officials no discretion to avoid imposing the requisite
duties in cases where the total duty would exceed the binding. Relying on past precedent
regarding such mandatory legislation in the GAIT and INTO, Argentina then suggested
that the mere possibility that such legislation could compel a violation of WTO
obligations was enough to condemn it, regardless of whether it had yet been applied in a
manner that resulted in a violation.
Chile made a number of arguments in response, most of which were of little avail on their
face. But it did have one argument with considerable force -- the price band law had been
amended to ensure that the total duties applied would never exceed the allowable duty
under thu binding. Whatever had happened in past practice, and even if the potential for
violations under this "mandatory" legislation was evident prior to its amendment, the
price band system as amended could no longer result in a violation of the Article II
bindings.
2.2.2 Article 4 of the Agriculturo Agreement
By way of background, one of the principal objectives of the Uruguay Round negotiations
was the reduction of barriers to trade in agricultural products. The negotiators undertook
to improve the transparency of such barriers as well as to reduce them, and an important
part of this process involved the "tariffication" of nontariff barriers, i.e., the conversion of
nontariff barriers into conventional tariffs. This process was to he completed by the end
of the Round. Nations with substantial nontariff barriers would have the opportunity to
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convert them into tariffs and schedule them even if the resulting tariffs exceeded their
prior tariff bindings under GATT.
Perhaps because it was contemplated that tariffication would be completed during the
Round, dhe Agriculture Agreement does not contain specilic text indicating what must be
"tariffied" in prospective terms. Instead, Article 4.2 pertaining to "market access" simply
provides:
Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any nieasurcs of the kind which
have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties,* exccpt as
otherwise provided lbr in Article 5 and Annex 5.
*These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies,
minimum import prices.,.and similar border measures other than ordinary customs
duties.
Argentina contended that the price band system was either a "variable import levy" or
"minimum import price" within the terms of the footnote, or at least a "similar measure"
that had been required to be tariffied. According to this theory, Chile could have availed
itself of the opportunity to convert the price band system into an equivalent conventional
tariff; and to adjust its binding if necessary before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Once the Round ended, however, Chile could no longer "maintain" the price band system,
whether or not it had taken tie opportunity to tarif 'y it.
Chile responded in a number of ways. It suggested that the duties associated with the
price hand system had not been required to bi converted into "ordinary customs duties"
because they were ordinary customs duties already, Indeed, said Chile, Argentina's
argument unler Article II of GAI' 1994, discussed above, is that the price band system
imposes tariffs in excess of the binding on "ordinary customs duties," and thus implicitly
concedes that the price band duties fall into that category. Chile argued further that the
price band system was not a "variable import levy" or "similar measure," pointing to the
conventional characteristics of such measures and to various distinctions between them
and the Chilean price band system. Finally, Chile argued that given the vagueness or the
footnote to Article 4.2 and its precise coverage, tile question of which measures "have
been required" to be converted should be answered based on the experience of the WTO
membership during the Unguay Round as to which types of measures had in) fact been
converted, or had been requested to be converted by other members. In this regard, Chile
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noted that price band systems in general had not been converted, mnd that no ncniber had
asked Chile to convert its price band system on any of the covcred products.
2.3 The Panel Decision
The panel began by rejccting Chile's suggestion that the amendment of Ihe price band
system mooted the dispute. Citing precedent, it held that the amendment of a measure
should not prevent the dispute process from examining it, and suggested that it could not
determine whether the amiendment resolved the dispute without first determining how, if
at all, the original measure violated WTO law.
2.3.1 Analysis under the Agriculture Agreement
Beginning with Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement, the panel rejected Chile's
suggestion that the measures that "have been required" to be converted were limited to
those that had actually been converted in practice, or that had bccn the subject of a
request for conversion by another member state, In so doing, it emphasized that Article
4.2 prohibits members from maintaining any measures "of the kind which have been
required to be converted," and argued that the phrase "of the kind" would have no purpose
were the obligation limited to measures that had actually been required to be convertcd. 2
Thus, whether or not any nation had asked Chile to convert its price band system and
whether or not other price band systems had in fact been converted, the issue for the panel
was whether the price band system was among the "measures" covered by the footnote to
Article 4.2.
To fall within the footnote, the price band system would have to constitute one of the
enumerated devices such as "variable import levies" or "minimum import prices," or at
least be among the "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties," The
panel noted that the specifically enumerated devices were not defined in the Agreement,
With reference to the footnote as a whole, the panel noted that "all the measures listed
there arc instruments which are characterized either by a lack of transparency and
predictability, or impede thde transmission of world prices to the domestic market, or
"Panel Rep. 1117.3-7.8.
12Panel Rep. 117.18.
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both." 13  It then examined various reports prepared by GAT agriculture committees
through the years, and on the basis of those reports set forth the "fundamental
characteristics" of variable import levies and "minimum import prices."
Ac panel concluded that variable levies typically operate on the basis of two prices: a
minimum threshold price linked to internal market prices or to a government target price,
and a border price for imports usually based on the lowest world market offer price. The
variable levy generally equals the difference between the second of these prices and the
first. Thus. the variable levy has the quality that when world market prices fall. the
variable levy rises. Likewise, variable levies tend to insulate domestic prices from
international price variations.
A minimum import price is similar to a variable levy in many respects, except that it
usually operates on the basis of the actual transaction price o' eact import shipment.
Whenever that price falls below the import price target, an additional duty is levied equal
to the difference. 't
The panel then noted that the Chilean price band system was not quite the same as either
a variable import levy or a minimum import price as it defined them. The price band
system did not rely on actual transaction prices like a minimun import price system, but
instead on a reference price based on -world market prices, a fact that made it more akin to
a variable import levy, But unlike traditional variable import levies, the threshold target
price was not based on domestic prices or a government target, but on average
international prices firom preceding years. And ncither variable levies nor minimum
import prices were generally accompanied by the possibility of a rebate when prices are
high. Nevertheless, the panel Ibund that the price band system was "similar" to variable
levies and minimum import prices. It insulated the Chilean market from international
price fluctuations to a significant extent, imposing a duty that rose as reference prices fell.
Likewise, the system was marked by a lack of transparency and predictability regarding
the selection of reference prices and markets, and the measurement of movement
charges.'
5
" Panel Rep. 1 7.34.
14Panel Rep. 7.36.
1;Panel Rep. 7.38-7.47.
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It remained to consider the argument that the price band system was not a "similar
measure other than ordinary customs duties" -- as noted, Chile claimed that the duties
under the price band system were indeed "ordinary customs duties." On this point, the
panel rejected the suggestion that all duties made subject to an Article II tariff binding
were "ordinary." Instead, it concluded that "ordinary" duties are either specific or ad
valorens tariffs that depend exclusively on the volume or value of the goods in question
and not on other "exogenous Ihctors." The amount of such duties is predictable and
transparent in accordance with the objectives of the tariffication process, and in contrast
to duties under the price band system. Thus, the price band duties were within the
footnote to Article 4.2, and because they did not fit any of the enumerated exceptions,
Chile had violated Article 4.2 by maintaining them after the close of the Uruguay
Round.Ib
2,3.2 Analysis under Article 11 of GAIT 1994
On their thce, the Article 1i bindings apply to "ordinary customs duties." In its analysis
under the Agriculture Agreement, the panel concluded that the price band duties were not
"ordinary customs duties." On the assumption that this phrase has the same meaning in
both the Agriculture Agreement and in Article 1I -- a proposition that no one contested --
the panel held that the price band duties could not be assessed under the first sentence of
Article 11(l)(b), which requires that "ordinary customs duties" not exceed the applicable
binding.
The second sentence of Article 11(l)(b), however, requires that "other duties and charges"
not exceed the amounts imposed on the date of the agreement, or thereafter required by
mandatory legislation in effect on that date. Further, the Uruguay Round Understanding
on the Interpretation of Article ll(l)(b) requires that "the nature and level of any 'other
duties and charges' levied on bound tariff items...shall be recorded in the Schedules..."
Chile had not listed its price band duties among tile "other duties or charges" in its WTO
tariff schedules, and on this basis the panel found that the price band system was a
violation of Article 11(1)(b), second sentence.17 It is noteworthy that this argument had
16Panel Rep. 117.48-7.65.
"
7Panel Rep. 117.104-7.108.
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not been advanced by Argentina, which instead rested its Article II claim on the
proposition that the price band system. prior to its amendment. could result in total duties
in excess of Chile's bindings.
2.4 The Appellate Body Decision
The Appellate Body addicssed somc procedural points that we note only in passing. It
held that the amcndmcnt of the price band system during the course of the dispute did not
preclude the panel from considering it, and frurther concluded that the panel could
evaluate the price hand system as amended as %Nell as in its original lbrm because the
amendmct did not change the "essence" of the systcm.18 This principle allows the
dispute process to proceed in Ihe Ibce of amendments or other changes to a challenged
scheme without the need for a new round of consultations, request for panel, and so on. It
thus allows dispute resolution to proceed more quickly and avoids the possibility of
strategic behavior that could delay it,
The Appellate Body also spent considerable time on the proper "order of analysis" in the
case -- Nlhutlier the panel should have addressed the Agriculture Agreement first or the
Article II issue first. It ultimately approved of the panel's decision to consider the
Agriculture Agreement first on the ground that its provisions more "specilically" address
the dispute. Chile apparently believed that had the Article 11 issue been considered first,
the panel might have ruled that the price hand system imposed "ordinary customs duties,"
and was thus outside the footnote to Article 4.2 of the Agriculturc Agreement, The
Appellate Body saw no merit in this contention, however, noting that the two provisions
create separate and distinct obligations and that the outcome of the dispute would be the
same regardless of the order of analysis."' As the issue seemrs quite unimportant for this
reason, we do not address it further.
2.4.1 Analysis of'the Agriculture Agreement
The Appellate Body began by considering Chile's argument, rejected below, that the
reference in Aiticlc 4.2 to measures that "have been required" to be converted limits the
8AB Rep. 1 1 34-44.
"AB Rep. 11178-9 1.
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obligation to measures that were in fact converted or had been requested to be converted.
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the use of the present perfect tense relbrs
to the obligation to convert measures at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round -- the
phrase "have been required" merely refers back to the point in time when tile obligation
arose, and does not limit the scope of the obligation to measures that were actually
converted or discussed. It firther emphasized that the footnote to Article 4.2 conlains an
illustrative and not exhaustive list of measures, thus suggesting that not all measures
covered by the obligation had been specifically identi lied by the end of the Round.
It then proceeded to review the question whether the price band system was among the
enumerated "measures" in the footnote, or at least "similar" to them. It quibbled with the
panel's notion of similarity, which had rested on the proposition that measures should
share some "fundamental characteristics." The Appellate Body thought that such a test
unnecessarily embroil:d the docisionmaker in assessing what is "fundamental" and what
is not, and preferred merely to search For "likeness or resemblance sullicient to be
similar."2' It also quibbled with the panel's resort to extrinsic materials, such as the
reports of old GAr agricultural committees, for the purpose of defining the concepts of
"variable import levy" and "minimum import price," preferring instead to rely on the
ordinary meaning of the words in their treaty context and in light of their object and
purpose, the familiar approach to treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention. 2'
Following this approach, it found that a "variable levy" was a measure whereunder the
amount of the duty was variable, mid the variability was attributable to the terms of the
measure itself (to differentiate it from an ordinary tariff, which could vary over time due
to legislative amnendment). In addition, a variable levy had to be at odds with the "object
and purpose" of Article 4, which meant that it must lack the "transparency and
predictability" of ordinary customs duties.? As to the concept of "minimum import
price," the Appellate Body accepted the panel's definition in terms of a target threshold
price and a levy that wvas based on the difference between the actual transaction price and
the target price.
20AB Rep. 1226.
2'AB Rep, 230-31.
2
"AB Rep. 234.
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Having defined the terms in the fbotnote, the Appellate Body proceeded to the question of
"similarity.' Chile again emphasized the ditTerences between traditional variable levies
as described by the panel, but the Appellate Body was unpersuaded. It found that Chile's
system could still have had the effect of insulating domestic prices from international
price movements. Further, many aspects of the system -- such as the selection of
reference prices aod the addition of movement charges to construct the price band -- were
not transparent and produced unpredictable results.
213
Chile contended that tile amendment to the law, which capped duties in accordance with
the Article !1 binding, distinguished the price band system from the "measures" that had
been required to be converted. But the Appellate Body found that the amendment to the
law did not alter the essential nature of the price band measure, its trade distorting elrecis,
or its lack of transparency and predictability.2 4 The Appellate Body made notu of the fact
that the reference price in the Chilean system was chosen in such a way that it might
"overcompensate" for downward price fluctuations in international markets,2 ' and also
noted that the lhilure to add movement expenses to the reference price tended to inflate
the amount of the duty,26 without explaining clearly why these flcts were important. The
Appellate Body firther argued that if the presence of a cap on measures such as variable
levies was enough to insulate them from the obligations oW Article 4.2. there would have
been no need to require conversion of any measure -- the negotiators could simply have
required that all agricultural tariffs be bound,2 7
Finally, the Appellate Body turned to the way that the panel had defined "ordinary
customs duties" as duties that depend only on the value or volume of the goods and not
on other "exogenous factors." It noted that nations may well choose to set their
"ordinary" duties based in part on "exogenous" considerations, and that the text of Article
I1 is quite unclear as to -what constitutes an "ordinary" duty or "other duties or charges,"
The fact that most member duties in most tariff schedules are simple ad valorem or
2JAB Rep. §246.
4AB Rep. 11254-62.
2MAB Rep. 1260.
'AB Rep. 250.
27AB Rep. §256.
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specific duties is not relevant as to what is "ordinary" in the language of the treaty --
member state practice is only relevant if it is "subsequent practice" under the Vienna
Convention, and tie panel had provided no support lbr the conclusion herc.2 The
Appellate Body accordingly reversed the panel in so far as it had defined "ordinary"
duties as duties that did not depend on "exogenous" factors, But that did not change the
fact that the price bnd system was "similar" to variable import levies and minimum
import prices, and thus a violation of Article 4.2.
2.4.2 Analysis Under Article 11 of GATT 1994
Chile argued on appeal that the panel erred when it found an inconsistency between tile
price band measure and Article 11(l)(b), second sentence, because Argentina had not
made such an argument during the course o1t the panel proceedings. The Appellate Body
concurred. Although Argentina's request for a panel was phrased broadly enough to
cover all aspects of Article 11, the fact that Argentina did not subsequently advance the
particular claim that the panel embraced meant that the panel had gone beyond an
"assessment of the matter before it" under Article II of the DSU. To do so deprived
Chile of "due process," as it was not on notice of the need to present a defense as to the
consistency of the price band system with Article 1l(l)(b), second sentence. 29
The Appellate Body thus overruled the finding against Chile under Article 1l(l)(b),
second sentence, because the issue was not properly bel'ore the panel. Because it had also
overruled the panel on the definition of "ordinary customs duties," it left open the issue
whether the price band system created "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties or
charges" for purposes of Article If. As it had already affirmed the finding that the price
band system violated Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement, the Appellate Body found
no need to address its consistency with Article 11(l)(b), first sentence.
3. Critical Analysis
3.1 Legal Commentary
3.1.1 The Agriculture Agreement
2SAB Rep. 273.
29AB Rep. 145-77.
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Article 4.2 is an odd provision in many respects, and there is certainly some force to the
position put forward by Chile. As indicated, Article ,1.2 states that members shall not
"maintain, resort to or revert to" any measures that "have bcen required to be convcrtcd
into ordinary customs duties," mid lists some examples of such measures in the footnote.
But nowhere in the Agriculture Agreement or in any other treaty text can one find a
complete listing of measures which "have been required" to be converted, and no text
contains any general criteria for the identification of such measures. The panel and the
Appellate Body arc no doubt right that many of the illustrative measures lack
transparency and predictability, but those criteria are not to be found in the text either,
In the face of a text that refers to measures that "have been required" to be converted, but
that lacks any comprehensix e listing of them or any general criteria for identifying them,
Chile's suggestion that the phrase refers back to a shared understanding among WTO
members developed during the Unguay Round has considerable plausibility. On this
reading, the measures that "have been required" to bc converted would be the sorts of
measures actually converted as a result of Uruguay Round negotiations. Members could
not maintain or revert to measures of that "kind," but could maintain other measures of a
kind that had not been converted. The fact that a number of nations had price band
systems. that apparently none were converted, and that no nation was asked to convert a
price band system then oflrs considerable evidence that price bands were considered to
be diffihrent from the measures that were converted, and that they had not been "required'
to be converted. The Appellate Body's observation that the footnote is illustrative and not
exhaustive is of little moment on this view, as it merely lists some examples of measures
that were in fact converted and was not intended to impose obligations with respect to
other measures. To be sure, such a reading of Article 4.2 would leave open the question
of what sort of measures are of the "kind" that had been converted, but shared practice
would at least provide a clearer guide as to the types of measures that the negotiators had
in mind.
We do not mean to say that the panel and Appellate Body were necessarily ,wong in their
legal disposition of the matter, but we do think it somewhat peculiar that WTO members
should have structured a binding obligation in such a loo. way as the case imagines -- a
non-exhaustive list of covered measures with no written set of unitying criteria, coupled
with a rather open-ended "similarity" inquiry to determine what other types of measures
were condemned. Such an approach is doubly peculiar in that the opportunity to convert
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to "ordinary customs duties" was lost as soon as the Uruguay Round ended. Members
would thus have been forced at the cnd of the Round to guess what measures were
covered and to convert all of those that might he covered lest they be lost and replaced
with nothing.
Perhaps Further reinforcing Chile's view is the fact that both parties to the dispute
apparently thought that the duties under the price band system vere covered by the
Article 11 bindings, which by their terms apply only to "ordinary customs duties." That is
why Argentina originally framed a claim under Article ll(l)(b), sentence one, and ignored
sentence two. But as Chile argued. if the price band system yielded "ordinary customs
duties" subject to the binding, then what is meant by a requirement that they be converted
into ordinary customs duties?
Lastly, we note the obvious difficulties inherent in "converting" the price band system
into conventional tariffs. Conventional tariffs would not have the moderating effect on
price fluctuations of the price band system, and to the extent that such moderation was a
goal of the Chilean system it could not be achieved using conventional duties. A
conventional tariff does not rise when international prices fall, or generate a rebate when
they ar high, Moreover, it is hardly clear how one would have determined the
conventional "tariff equivalent" of the price hand system (though, to be sure, the same
issue would have arisen for some of the other "measures' clearly covered by the footnote
to Article 4.2).
In sum, we see considerable basis to think that Chile's interpretation of the system is a
plausible one, though we hesitate to say which interpretation is right. Article 4.2 is no
model of clarity, and it comes as little surprise that it should be subject to controversy.
Given the Appellate Body's approach to the question o1 "similarity," the case also leaves
open a number of issues for the future. Are all price band systems "similar," or do some
remain permissible? What of" other conceivable mechanisms involving border measures
to stabilize domestic agricultural prices? How crucial to the finding of "similarity" were
the various factors that tended to inflate the duty under Chile's system, along with its non-
transparency and unpredictability?
3.1.2 Article II
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We have no quarrel with the principle that a panel should not rule sua s 7oe on matters
that neither party has raised, for as the Appellate Body indicated, basic issues of fairness
and due process are implicated when a party loses on grounds that it was not given an
opportunity to address. The decision to reverse the panel finding against Chile under
Article 110 )(b), second sentence, thus seenms the right one.
But the Appellate Body also avoided the issue tinder Article Ii(l)(b). first sentence, even
though it seemed to endorse the proposition that "ordinary customs duties" has the same
meaning in both Article 11 and the Agi iculturc Agreement. By holding that the price band
system had been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, the immediate
implication is that the duties tinder the price hand system arc not ordinary customs duties.
If that is right, then the panel's conclusion that the duties are outside the purview of'
Article 11(l h), sentence one. would seem to Iblow inexorably. But because the
Appellate Body ducked the matter, tite question whether a measure such as a price band
system is subject to the bindings of sentence one or to the scheduling obligation of
sentence two. and the broader question of what constitutes an "ordinary customs duty,"
remain quite muddled. This last question obviously has potential implications that extend
beyond the agricultural sector, although we are not in a position to assess its significance
in other areas.
3.2 Economic Commentary
From an cconoimic point of view, the wisdom ol' the ruling that (some? all?) price band
systems must be replaced with ordinary tariffs is rather difficult to assess because it turns
on competing fhctors. We first identify these factors. and then summarize their
implications.
3.2.1 Factor One: The Benefits of Tariftication
The tariffication process envisioned by the Agriculture Agreement facilitates the
negotiation betNeen governments of mutually beneficial and reciprocal reductions in
trade barriers. To develop this point, we identil', two prominent reasons that
governments may impose import barriers, and their implications for the role of reciprocal
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trade agreements in world trade. With this foundation in place, we next make the
argument that tariflication can facilitate mutually beneficial and reciprocal trade-
liberalization negotiations between governments,
We focus first on a political rationale for import barriers. To isolate this rationale, we
consider the situation in which a government presides over a small country. As is well
known, if* such a government were to maximiz, the national income of its country, then
its optimal unilateral trade policy would be free trade. Suppose, though, that the
government is motivated by political considerations as well. In particular, as suggested by
the theory ol' public choice, the government may he more sensitive to the impact of trade
liberalization on import-competing industries than on consumers. The underlying idea is
straightforward: import-competing industries are harmed by lower import prices and may
be better organized and more politically efficacious than consumers, who are the
beneficiaries of lower import prices. The government may therelbre wish to impose
import barriers. Accordingly, the government would then regard a reduction in import
barriers as costly, and such a "concession" would be entertained only if it could be
exchanged for some benefit that is offered by another nation.
This rationale on its own, however, does not give rise to an explanation for why
governments seek reciprocal trade negotiations. I' all countries are small with
governments that use import barriers tbr political reasons, then no one government can
adjust its trade policy and thereby confer a benefit to another, For example, if the
government of country A considers the proposal that it incur the cost of a reduction in its
own tariff in exchange for the benefit of a tariff reduction by country B, then the
government will reject this proposal as being one that has real costs but no benefits. This
is because the trade policy of a small country (country B) does not change world prices
and therefore does not offer any benefit to exporters in another country (country A).3 '
30 For further discussion of the theory of reciprocal trade agreements, see Chapter 2 of
Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of fle World Trading System,
2002, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA..
31 While the small-country assumption serves as a useful benchmark, it is not clear that
many countries are, in lhct. small. It is possible that a country is small in some markets
but not others, and likewise a country may be larger with respect to some countries (e.g.,
neighboring countries) than others. Further, even if it is posited that several countries are
(approximately) small, if such countries all cut tarlIf as part of a multilateral agreement,
then the combined impact of their tariff cuts could change world prices.
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The second rationale is economic in nature and derives from the possibility that the
country may he large. To isolate this case, suppose that the government ol'a large country
seeks to maximize national income. When the government of a large country imposes an
import barrier, some of the cost of the barricr is borne by foreign exporters, who sell at a
lower export price (i.e., lose access to the domestic market). Thus, if the government of a
large country imposes an import barrier, then domestic import-competing firms win,
domestic consumers lose, and foreign exporters lose. The loss experienced by foreign
exporters is an international externality that is associated with the government's trade
policy. Since the government does not internalize the costs of import barriers on foreign
exporters, the optimal unilateral trade policy is not free trade but rather entails import
barriers (e.g., positive import tariffs). In eff ct, with import barriers, the government
shifts onto foreign exporters some ol'the costs of helping its import-competing firms.
This rationale has the added benefit of suggesting a theory of reciprocal trade agreements.
Suppose that countries A and 13 are both large with governments that maximize national
income. When the government of country A reduces an import barrier below the optimal
unilateral level, it incurs a cost, and it is therefore willing to make such a concession only
if it expects a sufficient benefit from a reciprocal reduction in ion import barrier by the
government of country B. Given that country B is large, this expectation is now entirely
rational: when the government of country B3 reduces an import harrier, the exporters in
country A absorb some of the benefit since they sell at a higher export price (i.e., gain
access to country 13's market). ius, while each government has a unilateral incentive to
impose import barriers, the governments together have a collective incentive to negotiate
a trade agreement in which these barriers are reduced in a reciprocal mariner.
'The two rationales may be usefully joined. If countries are large with governments that
have economic and also political motivations, then, as the discussion above suggests, the
unilateral trade policies of governments result in import barriers. Furthermore, given that
an import barrier imposed by the government of any one country generates a negative
international externality to the (political-economic) welfare of the government of its
trading partner, the governments can negotiate mutually beneficial and reciprocal
reductions in trade barriers.
We emphasize that this perspective does not require that governments possess a
sophisticated understanding of ihe external ("terms-of-trade") effects of their respective
trade policies, or that govcrnments acting in isolation actually seek to raise national
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income through "optimal tariff' policies. Indeed, governments may impose tariffs for the
purely political reason noted above, and may evaluate prospective trade agreements from
a purely political orientation as wcll, balancing the political cost of a reduction in support
from import-competing interests against the political benefit of an increase in support
from export interests. The important point is that such an orientation reflects a belief on
the part of each government that a reduction in a trading partner's tariff would generate
some external benefit to domestic exporters. If pressed, government officials may offer
the specific explanation that the external benefit derives from the improved access that
exporters would then have to the trading partner's market. Frmm an economic
perspective, however, this is just another way of saying that a reduction in a trading
partner's tariff results in an increase in the price at which domestic exporters sell. This is
precisely the international externality that underlies the theoretical foundation presented
above.
Our discussion here suggests that the trade-policy relationship between governments has
the characteristic of a Prisoners' Dilemma game: the governments recognize that they are
each better off when the both liberalize than when they both impose import barriers, but
liberalization is difficult to maintain since each government does better yet if it alone
"cheats" and imposes import barriers. In light of this characterization, it is clear that a
trade agreement must have adequate enforcement provisions, so as to dissuade any one
government from cheating on an agreement to liberalize. The threat of retaliation is the
natural means of enforcing a trade agreement. A patient government will not pursue the
short-term benefit from cheating, if it recognizes that such behavior gives rise to a long-
term cost that is associated with retaliation (e.g., a return to unilateral policies),
With this context in place, we now discuss how tariffication facilitates the negotiation
between governments of mutually beneficial and reciprocal reductions in trade barriers.
The tariffication process has four important, and related, benefits, It lowers the
transactions costs of reciprocal trade negotiations, it increases the expected trade volume
resulting from tariff concessions, it reduces the uncertainty about trade volumes following
a trade agreement, and it makes easier the enforcement of a trade agreement,
The greater the number of protectionist policy instruments that affect trade in a given
product, the more difficult (and costly) it is to evaluate a particular concession on exports
of that product. It is much harder to estimate the gains in market access opportunities for
a reduction in a foreign tariff, for example, if exports subject to the lower tariff w ould
1q0
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also be subject to quotas, discriminatory domestic regulations, and other sorts of
protcctivc measures. And if trade negotiators fhce greater costs in the evaluation of loffers
by other nations, it is likely that fewer deals will be finalized in a given negotiating
window.
Similarly, if a number ot fprotectionist iolicy instruments can affect exports of a particular
product, it becomes harder to have a high degree of confidence about the increased trade
volume that will result from a concession on a particular instrument. Negotiators must
worry that the apparent benefits of a tariff concession, for example, will be wiped out by
unexpected consequences of some other protectionist instrument. Such possibilities
reduce the expected increase in trade volume associated with concessions on tariffs or any
other policy instrument and make them less valuable.
A firther point is that not all protectionist instruments are equally predictable as to their
effects on trade volume. A conventional tariff is generally thought to have relatively
more predictable effects than a quota, for example. With a tariff, exporters know exactly
how much "tax" they must pay to enter a given market. They will still face uncertainty
about that market due to the usual Ihtcors that affect market demand and supply, but at
least the amount of protection is certain, By contrast, under a quota, exporters must
worry that other supplier(s) will have the opportunity to fill the quota before them, or that
the importing nation will allocate quota in a way that disadvantages them. These
uncertainties are added to the usual demand and supply uncertainties. When trade
negotiators are averse to risk associated with the volume of trade under a trade agreement,
they will offer less to secure a given e volume of trade if the uncertaintX about the
volume of trade is greater.
Finally, if trade-policy instruments are non-transparent, then the enflorcement of trade
agreements is particularly difficult. Our discussion above emphasizes that trade-policy
interactions between governments share characteristics with the Prisoners' Dilemma
game. Each government makes a costly concession in order to enjoy the benefits of a
reciprocal concession by the other. If governmntS' trade policies were difficult to
observe, then each government would be tempted to (secretly) withdraw its concession.
Cheating of this kind can undermine a mutually beneficial trade agreement between
governments. Tariffication thus incilitates such agreements, since tariffs are transparent
and cheating is accordingly more difficult.
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For these reasons, it is in the mutual interest of parties to reciprocal trade negotiations to
limit the number of" protectionist instruments in play as much as possible, and to channel
protection into instruments that produce the least uncertainty about trading volume and
the least opportunity for cheating. Tariffs are generally regardcd as relatively transparent
and predictable, and so they are the natural choice as the favored protectionist instrument.
These observations go far toward explaining some basic structural features of the original
GATT -- the fact that negotiations were Focused on tariffs and the Article I bindings, the
presence of a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article Xl, and the
prohibition on discriminatory domestic regulations and taxes in Article ii.
The tariffication process under the Agriculture Agreement follows the same logic. The
agricultural sector, certainly more so than most, had seen a proliferation of trade barriers
beyond conventional tariffs. These barriers often resulted from the prevalence of
agricultural price support and stabilization policies, and the need to insulate domestic
markets from foreign price fluctuations if domestic targets were to be achieved. The
proliferation of these barriers -- the quantitative restrictions, variable levies, minimum
import price systems, and the like -- complicated market access negotiations in
agriculture because they made it difficult to evaluate conventional tariff concessions,
lessened the expected benefits of concessions on other policy instruments, increased the
uncertainty associated with agricultural trade, and made enforcement more difficult.
Tarillication addressed all of these problems.
3.2.2 Factor Two: The Effect of a Tariffication Requirement on the Average Tariff Level
If Chile's price band system was truly problematic, why did Chile's trading partners not
complain about it or raise the issue of tariffication explicitly during the Uruguay Round?
Why, for that matter, did other nations with price band systems not tariffy their price
bands or have discussions about the matter We cm only speculate as to the answer, but
it is possible that tariffication may have resulted in higher average protection, and this
prospect may have led trading partners to prefer that price bands remain in place.
The logic here is straightforward. One effect of the price band system was to reduce the
variability of Chile's internal prices by insulating them from international price
fluctuations outside of the price band. The rationale for such a system may lie in the fact
that Chile's agricultural producers care not only about the average price that they receive,
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but about its volatility -- i.e., that they are risk averse and to some degree will sacrifice
periods of high prices to avoid periods of low prices.
If that is correct, then agricultural producers will be happy to trade off some reduction in
average prices received to reduce uncertainty about price. And if' political opposition
exists to higher agricultural prices, the resulting political equilibrium may well entail
some sort of device to reduce volatility, for which agricultural producers will "pay" in the
form of lower average prices. One way to see (lie point is to imagine two different
protectionist regimes -- one with a fixed conventional tariff, and one with a price band.
Let the tvo regimes be designed so that agricultural producers are indifferent between
them. Thus, assuming risk aversion on the part of the agricultural producers, the price
band system will produce lower prices on average. The domestic opponents of high
agricultural prices will likely prefer the price band option for that reason, even if they are
indifferent to price volatility themselves. Put differently, a price band system -- with its
reduced price volatility -- may be Pareto optimal from a domestic political standpoint.
If the government is subsequently prohibited from maintaining a price band system and
forced to substitute a conventional fixed tariftl the new domestic political equilibrium
will likely involve a higher tariff on average. Intuitively, as agricultural producers are
confronted with the prospect of greater price variability, their demand for protection will
intensify. Assuming that domestic opponents of high agricultural prices are not
themselves significantly harmed by greater price variability, the domestic political
process might be expected to achieve a new equilibrium in which the fixed tariff is
positioned above the average tariff under the price band system.
If we are right to this point, then it is conceivable that trading partners would prefer to
allow the price hand system to persist rather than to he "tariffied," despite its
disadvantages as noted earlier. Tariffication would raise thfe average degree of protection
that they confront on their exports. and as a consequence tariffication would contribute to
a lower expected export price (i.e., lower expected market access). But Nve also note that
the price band system may ampli1, (exogenous) fluctuations in the prices that exporters
receive. For example, when the export (i.e., world) price for a product is low, the price
band system may call for a higher tariff, which works to further depress the export price.
The rebate under the price band system when prices are high also tends to increase the net
price received by foreign sellers. Tariffication may thus diminish the variability of the
price at which exporters sell. An argument that trading partners are hurt by tariffication
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thus turns on the proposition that the cost to exporters of any associated decrease in the
average export price outweighs the benelit o'any associated reduction in the variability of
export prices. This is more likely to hold if Chilean import-competing finns are more
risk averse than are foreign exporters, or if the effects of Chile's price band on prices
elsewhere is modest because Chile is a relatively small component of total demand..
3.2.3 Summary of Implications
Our discussion in the preceding subsection raises the possibility that trading partners may
be better off with the price band than without it. This possibility seems even more
plausible when, as with the amended Chilean system, the importing nation makes clear
that it will never exceed its Article 11 binding. Recall that Chile had bound its tariffs at
31.5 percent, but its applied ad valorem duty was only 7-8 percent. Even with the price
band system, the total duty was usually less than 31.5 percent, and could never be higher
after the law was mnended. It seems somewhat odd to condemn Chile under these
circumstances when it had the right to impose a fixed 31.5 percent tariff if it wished, and
it is difficult to imagine that the lack or "transparency and predictability" in the price band
system could have done more to limit trade than a fixed tariff set at the level of the
binding. Indeed, regardless of risk preferences, foreign exporters are better off facing
tariffs that are variable over some range than a tariff that is fixed and set equal to the top
value (i.e., the binding) of that range.
We are cognizant of the fact that, to some extent, this argument proves too much. First, if
we are right that the level of trade protection will be less on average if the price band
system is allowed to remain in place, why did Argentina bring a case? It must have
expected to gain from the proceeding. It is possible to speculate - perhaps Argentine
exporters are risk averse and expected that Chile would set a fixed tariff sufficiently
below its binding to leave them better off; or perhaps Argentina expected to extract some
settlement by filing a strategic suit. It is also possible that Argentina was motivated to
challenge the law before its amendment clarified that the tariff would never exceed tile
binding, and for some reason felt obliged to continue the case even after the amendment
was passed. But we do not know the answer to this question.
Second, the Chilean price band system is similar to classic variable levies, which were
tarifficd in at least some cases during the Uruguay Round. If devices for reducing price
volatility were on balance useful to the trading system because they facilitated a reduction
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in the average level of protection, vhy were any of these devices made subject to
tariffication? In thinking about this question, it is useful to distinguish between
transparent and non-transparent devices. Following our discussion above on the bencfits
of' lariffication, it may be argued that non-transparent devices impede effective
negotiations. Tariffication of such devices may thus facilitate mutually beleficial trade
liberalization. Is the Chilean price band system "non-transparent?" Again, it is useful to
contrast this system with a transparent tariff that is set at the binding. As long as it can be
verified that the import tariffs called for under the price band system do not exceed the
binding, the system is transparent in the sense that it can be verificd that the negotiated
binding is not violated. From this perspective, a price band system that is capped at the
negotiated binding captures the main benefits of tariflication while also providing trading
partners with fiequent "gifls" of import tariffs that arc strictly below the binding. We
may thus endorse the tariffication of non-transparent measures generally, yet still wonder
about the wisdom of tariffying a price band system that includes a cap to ensure that the
tariff binding is never exceeded.
4. Conclusion
The Chilean price band system raised a difficult case from a legal perspective, and an
intriguing set of issues from an economic perspective. On the legal side, Chile's position
had some appealing elements. No ,TO member had asked Chile to tariffy its price band
system during the Uruguay Round, and other members had apparently retained their own
price band systems. The lack of clear criteria in the Agriculture Agreement lbr
determining which measures should be tarifflied furt er buffered Chile's suggestion that
shared understanding during the negotiation process should be the touchstone. Once
Chile amended the system to ensure that total tariffs never exceeded its binding, it
apparently brought itself into full compliance with what it fairly understood to be its
obligations under the Agreement.
Argentina's position also had its strengths. The price band system surely bore
considerable resemblance to enumerated measures in Article 4 of the Agriculture
Agreement that wcrc tariffied, and it is thus reasonable to deem it "similar." Chile's
system also lacked transparency in many respects, and no doubt frustrated trading
partners who were unable to predict the variable levy with confidence.
16"
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Accordingly, it seems to us that the dispute could plausibly have been resolved either
way. It is difficult to say which resolution is the "right" one as a legal matter.
From an economic perspective, the case is also a hard one, We cannot confiduntly say
whether the demise of Chile's price band system will be trade liberalizing or trade
restricting. It will be most interesting to sce what fixed tariff rate Chile sets when it
eliminates the price band It would be an interesting though no doubt challenging exercise
to compare it with the average total tariffs during the price band system to sec which is
higher, and to compare trading volumes before and after to sec if access to Chile's market
has been enhanced or diminished.
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